Old societies had the following superstition: Certain persons had demons attached to them, and things that they had used were considered "unclean." These things then became forbidden objects; if one came into contact with them, then one's body, too, would be polluted by the demonic influence.

In the realm of man's culture, among the things created by man, art should be beautiful; its primary essential characteristic should be that it be able to evoke a sense of beauty in the person, that by its beauty it be able to provide for the person the pleasure of the sense of beauty. This is a fact that no one can deny outright. However, saying that art should be beautiful is not the same as saying that all art is (...) beautiful. In fact, there is art which is beautiful and art which is not beautiful; and this too is a fact that no one can deny. (shrink)

In Ai Ssu-ch'i is exemplified and substantiated the Soviet influence on the official definition of philosophy in the history of Communist Party of China, i.e., the assertion about and the method for knowledge of the world. Such a philosophical knowledge has as its formal object the most fundamental laws of the universe.In order to acquire such a genuine philosophical knowledge, one needs a desire to change the world and a proletarian point of view. For only by aiming at changing the (...) world is inevitability reflected; only in the proletarian viewpoint are the objective laws reflected. In order to substantiate these assertions, one has to point out that, first, man's thinking is determined by his social relations and, secondly, social relations are determined by practice. Since the proletariat is in the right kind of practice, it is both in the proper locus of social relations and, therefore, it perceives both inevitability and objectivity. Yet, due to man's subjective dynamism, it is possible for other classes to adopt the standpoint of the proletariat. (shrink)

Ai Ssu-ch'i is a little known but very important figure in the introduction of Marxism-Leninism into China. This first article provides a brief biography of Ai Ssu-ch'i as well as a detailed account of his activities as teacher, author and propagandist. Among his other services to the cause of Marxism-Leninism in China, one has to stress Ai Ssu-ch'i's systematic opposition to Yeh Ch'ing and to the non-Communist interpretation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. (cf.SST 10 (1970), 138–166.).

Introduction Marxism did not come to China simply as one of the many waves from abroad that inundated Chinese intellectual life during the late Ch'ing ...

Comrade Huang Yüeh-mien's article, "A Discussion of the Aesthetics of the Wealthy" [Lun shih-li che ti mei-hsüeh], which criticized my point of view in aesthetics, was published later than my self-criticism. Before he published it, he had presented it at a discussion meeting at Peking Teachers College. He let me read it only after he had submitted it to Literature [Wen-i pao] for publication. I wrote to the editor of Literature, Comrade K'ang Cho, saying that basically I accepted his criticisms (...) but that I wished to raise a number of points. I pointed out that the author's method of dealing with the problems of "empathy emotion," "forgetting self," and "inspiration" was not very different from the method that I had used before. I pointed out that "association of ideas" occupied an important position in his aesthetics — he seems to substitute "association of ideas of form" for "intuition of form." Furthermore, I stated that I did not think he had answered clearly the questions of whether "beauty exists in the mind or in the thing," of the relationship between beauty and sense of beauty, and of the difference between formal thought and abstract thought; and I said that I hoped he would give me more assistance with these questions. However, Comrade Huang Yüeh-mien for the most part ignored the points that I had raised and the questions to which I had sought answers, and he published in Literature the paper that he had presented at Peking Teachers College almost unaltered. Consequently, the questions that I raised concerning Comrade Huang Yüeh-mien's point of view in aesthetics remain unanswered. At that time I still felt that his point of view in aesthetics basically was materialistic, although there were some tendencies in it that raised doubts in my mind. This explains the fact that my judgments on idealist aesthetics remain to be improved. (shrink)

The essays on aesthetics in recent publications, beginning with the criticisms of Chu Kuang-ch'ien's point of view in aesthetics and continuing down to his article "How Can Aesthetics be Materialistic and Dialectic?" [Mei-hsüeh tsen-yang ts'ai neng shih wei-wu ti yu shih pien-cheng ti?"], have focused on the problem of the relationship between the subjective and the objective in beauty and in sense of beauty. This is a fundamental problem in aesthetics, and only when we have solved this problem can we (...) answer the questions of what beauty is and wherein beauty lies. Some people have presented their own tentative answers to these questions, and these have been discussed by our comrades. (shrink)

After reading the essays of Mr. Ts'ai and Mr. Chu, I have a few immature opinions. Generally speaking, I feel that in dealing with the errors of their opponents, both Ts'ai I in his criticism of Huang Yüeh-mien and Chu Kuang-ch'ien in his criticism of Ts'ai I are quite accurate and convincing. However, in presenting their own arguments of what is right, both of them are on shaky ground and in error. That is because in one way or another, consciously (...) or unconsciously, they either deny the objective aspect of the existence of beauty or deny the social aspect of the existence of beauty . All of them consider the objective and the social aspects of beauty as being either this or that, as mutually exclusive and irreconcilable opposites. They think that if we acknowledge the social aspect of beauty, we then have to deny the objective aspect, the fact that the existence of beauty does not depend on the subjective conditions of a person ; or if we acknowledge the objective aspect, we have to deny the social aspect, the fact that the existence of beauty depends on the social life of human beings. But in fact it is not like that. On the one hand, beauty cannot be separated from human society; on the other hand, it can have an objective existence which is independent of man's subjective consciousness. It is this question that I shall discuss. (shrink)

After reading the recent essays in the People's Daily [Jen-min jih-pao] by Comrade Ts'ai I, Comrade Chu Kuang-ch'ien, Comrade Li Che-hou, and others on the problems in aesthetics, I feel that they contain both accuracies and inaccuracies concerning the basic questions with which they have dealt, and here I would like to discuss my views on the problems involved in the debate.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS AND HEIDEGGER: THE QUESTION OF BIDLOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY VINCENT GUAGLIARDO, O.P. Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology Graduate Theological Union Berkeley, Oalifornia I N IDS BOOK, Hediegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, John D. Caputo recommends a " deconstruction" of Aquinas' philosophical theology in order to let.the true ·element orf his thought, mysticism, come to the fore. Caputo argues persuasively that Aquinas' thought, expressed ·as.it is in (...) the garh of metaphysics, cannot escape Heidegger':s critique of met:aiphysfos as "onto-theo-logioal ". Aquinas, no more thoo.any other thinker of the West, has succeeded mavoiding this iorgorttenness. Those Thomi:sts who have tried to argue that Aquinas.is an exception rto this critique, Caputo oontends, have not succeeded in presenting their case. The verdict o.f Heidegger stainds. The on:ly reoourrse left is thart of deconstruction, which Capurto presents ais gaining mther than losing the true Aquinas precisely because deconstruction.allows us to move from the said (the metaphysical dimension) fo rbhe uil!said (the mystical dimension) of Aquinas' thought. The uns1aiid is the kernel, the center a;ro:und which whatever Aquinas says moves. It is the true dimension which his thinking il'eally seeks: union with God, in wh~ch both the union and God 1are themselves rineff1a;ble.1 There is, however,.a disturbing problem which I find wti:th Capui;o's conclusion. This problem does not have to do with his oonte!lltion that the true kernel of St. Thomas' thought!is mysticail. Ra.ther, the problem concerns what is being disen1 See John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An }j}ssay on Overcoming Metaphysics (N.Y.: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp. 211 & 247-8. 407 408 VINCENT GUAGLIARDO; O.P. gaged and put out of play tin the deconstrrucrb.ion, namely: philosophical thoology.2 What are the iimplicatfons of such a movie? Are they desirable for theology? Ought we and oan we, 1a;s Caputo suggests, disengage,and leave behind St. Thomas' philosophical theology because metaphysical without there being any true loss? Might we be facing a;n impoverishment of another kind: in a moI"e " radical " seeking of the dii.vine might we not be losing something m'a foI"getfulness of ourselves as,.after 1 all, omy human? ls not this something precisely the,realm of the humanitas of the homo huma,nus, which Heidegger 's thinking seeks Ito point out and draw us closer to, where humanitas refers to our necessary trelation to Heing, from whlch relation we as humans cannot detach ourselves so long as we are " auf die Erde "? 3 The ~oblematic In beginning our inquiry I would like to distinguish three different regions of human engagement in which the over1appii.ng of one onto the other ii.s not.always easy to discern: philosophy, phl1osopihioal theology and mysticism.. I want to say "iphilosophical theology " and not simply " theology " because I think that it ii.s not possible to thoologize without 1 at the same time also philosophiizing. I 1think St. Tihomas thought this as well. 'l\hat is why his theology was always philosophioa ;l, 1in dialogue wiith :the philosophers: Aristotle, the Platonists, Ma~monides and the Ail1abs. In saying this, however, I do not mean to,say that philosophy 1and theology 1 are 1 the same. Now the altemativce which Caputo would ha,ve us embrace, because presumably not onto-theo-logioal, is that of a "reli2 See Caputo, op. cit., 11 & 283. a" Die Wahrheit des Seins denken, heisst zugleich die humaniitas des homo humanus denken " (" Brief iiber den Humanismus," in W egmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), p. 349). This Latin expression is a.lso used by St. Thomas in De ente et essentia, III, to designate the formal principle (rationality) by which. the whole (an individual human being) becomes a whole. Also see In Met., VII, Leet. 5, nn. 1378-1380. THE QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY 409 giious 1alerthi0Jogy" of mysticism.4 One is.then led to ask whether and if,so, how, the same person could ibe hoth a philosopher and 1a mystic, i.e. both!a thinker and a person of [aith. Do they remain " existentially " opposed,,as... (shrink)